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AN

EXPOSURE

OF THE

Persecution

OF

LORD MELVILLE:

IN

A LETTER

TO

AN INTIMATE ACQUAINTANCE.

"Huge uproar lords it wide."—THOMSON.

LONDON:

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AN

EXPOSURE,

&c.

MY DEAR SIR,

I AM not only willing, but anxious to justify myself to you upon all occasions; for you well know your good opinion is more likely than any thing else to raise me in my own estimation. Upon the question, to which your letter refers, we cannot both be in the right; and you must pardon me if I suspect you of having, for once, surrendered your own good sense to the discretion of the multitude. Yet, if I have decided contrary to your *judgment*, I am sure I have not done so from a partiality to corruption; and I persuade myself you will believe me, when I assert that I should find it no very easy victory to subdue within myself a detestation of delinquency, either public or private.

I never received any favour from Lord Melville. I am wholly unacquainted with him. I never was

in his company, and, except once, and that at a distance, I never even saw him. If, therefore, I do not, in common with my countrymen, owe something to his Lordship for a long, laborious, active, and faithful discharge of his public duty ;— I am entirely free from obligation of any sort.

Such being the case, it may occasion surprise that I should, with so much zeal, oppose my opinions respecting him to those which I have lately heard in your company. To you, I trust, I may safely declare, that my only motive for taking the part which I did take in the conversations to which you allude, was my conviction (what grounds may hereafter be laid for the condemnation of his Lordship I cannot foresee) that the popular clamour at this time raised against him, however loud it may be, is not more loud than unjust.

I cannot without disgust and indignation witness the conduct of many, and some in particular of his Lordship's countrymen, who are little more than the creatures of his countenance ; who, in his prosperity, applauded him for virtues which he possibly did not possess, and expressed a pride in having received marks of his favour and condescension. I cannot suppress emotions which I think do me credit, when I hear such men who have not understanding to discriminate between

right and wrong, or principle to incline them to the right, join their feeble cry to complete the full chorus of popular clamour against their benefactor. When we witness such flagrant ingratitude, and are sensible of its effects, it is then indeed time to substitute deliberation for noise. It is then that a man, if he feels conscious of a drop of "British blood" creeping through his veins, will be sensible of the quickening of its circulation, and be roused into a scorn of those undue means by which an injured individual may suffer an increase of oppression. It is then that such a man might burst through every restraint, and let loose a manly rage against convicted malversation. But, if his sentiments were tempered by justice, he never could endure to see a trial of the accused anticipated by his punishment.

I will not here repeat any of the numerous arguments I have read either in proof of the guilt or the innocence of Lord Melville. He will, I trust, have abler advocates. I think it but just, however, that he should not stand disgraced in the public opinion until some act *intentionally criminal* shall have been proved against him. And I think it enormously wicked to work a prejudice in the public mind by the propagation of stories, which, whether true or false, are unconnected with the case.

Lord Melville may yet be proved guilty. If this should happen, I shall participate in a rational satisfaction upon the exposure of crimes; as it may be reasonably hoped that such an exposure will tend to the better administration of our affairs. Yet, I trust and believe I shall never be able to indulge a savage and a senseless joy upon any such occasion; or to contemplate, without a mixture of regret, the fall of any man from the eminence to which he had raised himself, by a labour of forty years.

I am not one of those who think it necessary to view the great national concerns in a mysterious light. I have always thought our public relations might well be assimilated to those of domestic life. The rule of our conduct, with respect to foreign states, originated in nothing more than a sense of the obligations we lay under, where our neighbours are concerned, in private life. The same observation holds with greater force when applied to public servants. They are really in the employ of every individual in the state: from each they receive their wages: they manage the concerns of each: each profits by their fidelity: each suffers by their frauds: and, mediately or immediately, they are responsible to each. Considering it in this point of view, it is difficult to reconcile with any of those feelings, by which man is made amiable, the frantic exultation that seems to be expected from us

on the present occasion. For my own part, I do not hesitate to declare, if a man had served me for forty years, and I then had reason to believe him culpable, on account of an irregularity in having deviated from the letter of my instructions, I could not cast aside all memory of his former services, and suffer myself to be transported with delight by the ruin which, forgetful of his merits, I had decreed to his failing. If I could do so, I must be sensible I was different from that which I thank Heaven for having made me. But if an old and faithful servant had not been proved to have committed a single act of dishonesty; if the irregularities alleged against him had not contributed one shilling either to his profit or to my loss; if no sinister motive had been established; if he professed himself ready and willing to enter into an account and explanation of his conduct, and to repel every imputation which could stain his integrity, and I, in the absence of any evidence as to criminal intention, disregarding his protestations, and rejecting his defence, proceeded to strip him of his office, and cast him forth into the world with every thing odious upon his character which my malice could stick to it, and then derive satisfaction from having done so; I am confident, if my judgment did not utterly forsake me, that I should pronounce myself depraved; and believe that I had mistaken myself for a man, when in reality I had been a monster.

And yet this is precisely what every body is now either doing or expected to do. Oppression and cruelty may change their name, but they cannot alter their nature: and injustice, although millions combine in its perpetration, will remain injustice still.

I do not, and I never did say any thing of the Resolutions which were voted by the House of Commons, but I say those Resolutions do not impute a vindictive spirit, an implacable temper, or a corrupt disposition to the person who was the object of them. And why then should I not combat such imputations when maliciously brought forward? They never were in contemplation of the tribunal before which Lord Melville stands, and cannot now be urged against him by his enemies without a manifestation of their existence in themselves.

I no more object to the *Report* of the Commissioners, than I do to the Resolutions of the House; but, although something of culpability, which does not appear to have proceeded from corruption, has been established, I will not give my consent to the public, or any individual of the public, heaping up fabricated crimes upon the top of that culpability, for the purpose of overwhelming a man who is now upon his trial, and whose corrupt intention remains yet to be proved.

I am well aware of my own insignificancy, but I am also aware that the clamour in question has been raised and is supported by men as insignificant as I am; nor am I ignorant of the fatal influence which popular uproar has had upon many cases; and I will never sit silent, when, by recalling the reason of misguided men, I can prevent them from unanimity in an unjust condemnation. It is no very difficult matter to convince any body who has not flung away his reason for the purpose of carrying his error with the greater conveniency, that little of what is almost universally asserted against Lord Melville has been proved; and (more cannot now be said) that the punishment he has already suffered, is fully commensurate with the offence of which he has been convicted.

That my Lord Melville did permit Mr. Trotter to make advantage of the public money is not to be denied; and that he himself applied a part of it, which he obtained for the service of the navy, to other national purposes, is admitted. But this is "the very head and front of his offending;" and, in conceding so much, we must remember that the extent to which Mr. Trotter trafficked is not proved, but taken for granted to be unbounded; that it no where appears Lord Melville was aware of his having carried his speculations (if in truth he did so carry them) to a very great length; and his Lordship may yet prove, as I apprehend it is

open for him to do, that, although he actually diverted the money from one public service to the temporary use of another, yet that he did so without any sort of personal consideration or personal benefit; and that, in doing so, he facilitated the service, promoted the interest, and saved the purse of the nation. It is true, indeed, that he did not rigorously confine himself within the letter of the statute; but what should we say to a man so extensively trusted, if he had suffered our interests to be deteriorated, rather than incur any degree of responsibility in the conduct of our affairs?

This part of the charge will, I confidently expect, prove to be no more than his having hazarded something for our benefit, when, if he had been indifferent to our welfare, he would have considered his duty and our inconvenience to be compatible, and looked from our interests to his own security.

I am not, by any means, an advocate for suffering the law to be violated; but many cases may be put in which we should all pronounce a Minister unworthy of his office if he did not act from a sense of his duty alone. If, in doing so, he went against the law, it would be incumbent on him to make out a very strong and a very pressing case to justify or excuse him. Yet such cases may exist—and I confess to you, constituted as I am, I cannot

help thinking that to ascribe corrupt motives to a man who has merely acted for the advantage of others, without any view to his own benefit, nay, contrary to his interests, would be carrying the doctrine of presumption somewhat too far.

You ask me why he did not come to Parliament for a bill of indemnity?—I tell you, in return, if he had not felt confident in his rectitude, he would have done so. When obtained on behalf of a Minister, I look upon a bill of indemnity to be neither more nor less than a protection for him after he shall have lost his power. The same reason or the same influence which could procure the passing of the bill, must necessarily protect him from punishment or censure—for such a law is never passed but upon the supposition that, in justice, he ought not to be obnoxious to either. Our experience however may have proved, that the parties (as they are called) in Parliament generally think, or at least act, in diametrical opposition to each other; and it has therefore been deemed expedient by Ministers to foreclose, as far as they can, the opinion of Parliament in cases wherein their own safety may be endangered by a change. It is the apprehension of danger which leads a Minister to apply for a bill of indemnity. Will my Lord Melville's most virulent enemy say, that he could not have obtained such a bill if he had but applied for it? I think not. As he omitted

this, we must believe he did so from feeling that he had nothing to fear; and a freedom from fear is no bad argument of a freedom from guilt. Or do you join in insisting that, from a consciousness of innocence, a criminal intention is to be inferred? Every man, my dear Sir, has an interest in the judgments pronounced by the nation to which he belongs. Do not therefore, I beseech you, assist in quibbling away the reputation of a great and a meritorious man.

Why did he not apply for a bill of indemnity? The question, I know, did not originate with you, and I therefore declare to you without scruple that it offends me. Must we not admit a man to be free from vice when his enemies impeach him of his virtues? Why should he who has appealed to his own heart, and received its dictates in his favour, fear the censures of any other tribunal? Armed in his honesty, Lord Melville disdained that shield which had so often warded off the stroke of justice from the guilty head, and, proudly arrayed in the purity of his intentions, he feared no ill.

I cannot help (and I would grieve if I could) feeling for the distress of a man who has proved to me by all his acts that he had the most firm reliance on his own innocence. It is his misfortune, and a grievous one it has been, that he was

not at liberty to enter into an explanation of this charge when it was under discussion. But, if prejudice will only stand neuter in the mean time, I hope and I believe all will terminate in his honour.

What my Lord Melville has offered to swear, we may believe he will swear; and in this stage of the case we ought to receive it as if it had been sworn. I do not, I admit, approve of suffering a man, after having been examined himself, and after he might have taken an opportunity of explaining his conduct, a case of any sort being made out against him, to come forward with an exculpatory affidavit. Confined to this case, I should not apprehend any bad consequence even if it were to go so far; but it is obvious that the admission of it, as a precedent, would be injurious in judicial proceedings, inasmuch as it must have a strong tendency to the commission and even to the encouragement of perjury. But still I say that the document in question, if it be not inconsistent with the matter reported, ought in justice and by the rules of law to have its effect in the mitigation of our judgment.

Now let us, I pray, my dear Sir, consider for a moment the gross and palpable injustice which Lord Melville suffers by the manner in which this paper is generally viewed. I am far from contending that it ought to have any weight as against

the *Report*. I have disavowed any such doctrine already, and I disavow it again; but I say it never was intended that it should have any such weight; and I will assert that, in justice, equity, and common sense, it ought, as to every other purpose, to have as much force now as it could have had if incorporated with the evidence which was taken by the Commissioners. In order that the popularity of the Commission may be brought to bear upon his Lordship, this letter is represented as an attempt, upon his part, to invalidate the evidence which was taken by the Commissioners. But it is no such thing—far from it. On the contrary, it goes expressly to a point which the Commissioners themselves know was not in evidence at all; and merely exhibits the reasons which induced his Lordship to decline answering their interrogatories. Yet we are told that this letter must be rejected—and why? Because it is contradictory to the testimony upon which the Commissioners have reported.

Now, although I agree with the Commissioners in their Report of the facts, I cannot go along with them in the deductions which they have drawn from Lord Melville's silence, nor do I think it was incumbent on them to draw any. The fact which they have reported as proved, is proved—but I distinguish between their Report and their reasoning. Their Report is right; their reason-

ing, in my humble judgement, is wrong. We frequently see different and even opposite conclusions drawn from the same premises. When a case comes to a question of reasoning, every man has a right to use his own; and I as good to use mine as the Commissioners had to use theirs. Keep it therefore in your mind, although the Commissioners have stitched their Report and their reasoning together, that there is no necessary connexion between their judgement upon the fact and their extrajudicial Elaborations.

If it be true (and it is certain) that an act cannot be guilty but from a guilty concurrence of the mind, the letter in question must have its weight. So far as the Commissioners had a right to go, it goes along with them.—Its only tendency is to cut off a conclusion which is at this moment as open to the judgement of the public and the Parliament as it could have been, if the Report had never been made.

Considering it therefore as I do, the letter is not in the most remote degree at variance with the Report—Each may stand by itself without producing the slightest inconsistency. If my Lord Melville had made the letter a part of his deposition, it could not or ought not at least to have altered the opinion of the Commissioners as to the

fact; to which alone they should, in my opinion, have confined themselves.

The letter certainly proves that Lord Melville did not participate with Mr. Trotter in his emoluments: and this is an offence with which the Commissioners do not charge him. It merely renders that certain which was, as I conceive, fairly inferable before. His Lordship's enemies are however prepared upon all sides.—On this they are regardless of his assertions; and they impute guilt to his silence on the other. With their eyes stedfastly fixed upon his conviction they overlook every intermediate object; and, because he has been deemed censurable by Parliament, expect that he shall be pronounced criminal by the people. After all, what do I desire? No more surely in this than you and I would expect in every other case—and I fear it would "go hard" with us all if we ceased to distinguish between infamy and error.

I confess to you, I think his Lordship was over-scrupulously conscientious in the delivery of his evidence. I appeal to you, and would confidently appeal to any man not under the direct dominion of prejudice, if it can be believed of a person in his high station (leaving his long-tried principles out of the question), that he would hazard the reproach of peculation for the temporary accommodation of

20,000*l.* from his agent, that agent having securities (or even without them) in his hands at the time?—And here, let me observe, the Report on this part of the case confines itself to a statement of the advances having been made by Mr. Trotter, he not considering whether he made them out of his public or his private balances. But I do not recollect any part of it which states what proportion, or whether any or all of the money so *advanced*, was the actual property of Lord Melville himself.

And is it just, under all these circumstances, to reject this letter? It would be monstrous;—for I repeat to you, it does not combat a single tittle of the evidence upon which the Commissioners have founded their Report, but goes merely to prevent an inference of his Lordship's having participated with Mr. Trotter in any advantage which *he* might have derived from a use of the public money.

Must we then, with the evidence of his innocence in this respect before us, still believe him to be guilty? Are we to annex the imputation of turpitude and guilt to an indulgence (I grant you indiscreet), the benefits of which were confined to Mr. Trotter alone? And at this time, when his honour is unimpeached, and with proofs in our possession of his being wholly guiltless of any inte-

rested intent, to treat him like a felon and an outlaw, and pursue him with our execrations?

The motives of this nobleman's enemies are sufficiently obvious, from their artful introduction of invidious terms. They tell us he must be called on to *refund* the money of the public. Yet I do not understand the meaning of the word refund, if it be at all applicable to this case. It is not pretended that a shilling of the public money has been drawn which has not been accounted for, although any person hearing the language of his Lordship's persecutors would conclude that he had taken large sums from the Treasury, which they were anxious to make him restore to it again. It never can enter into the imagination of any man, when these refundings are spoken of, that there is not at least something to be accounted for or explained. Yet the facts are, that he has reckoned for the money to a fraction:—that the public have not lost a shilling:—that no person has suffered the slightest inconvenience:—that no payment has been delayed for a day;—and that the money used by Mr. Trotter could not have been applied to any national or other use, even if he had not drawn it from the Bank of England.

Is it not extraordinary, in spite of all this, that nine men in ten of those we converse with have

been inveigled into a belief that the public are losers in proportion to Mr. Trotter's gains, and that their satisfaction is to consist in his refunding? Yet, in truth, if Mr. Trotter or Lord Melville should be held accountable for the profits of the money which was in their hands, it must follow that the advantage will be entirely on the side of the public; that they will have gained by speculations into which they themselves could not have entered; and that Mr. Trotter will have speculated at the risk of himself and his principal, for the benefit of the nation alone. You will observe I do not excuse this risk of the national treasure, nor do I justify the motive which led to such an use of it; but I repeat that which cannot be denied:—if Lord Melville and Mr. Trotter shall be held accountable for the profits of the money in question, the public will derive a considerable advantage, which, without the intervention of those parties, they could not have obtained. I mention the circumstance to shew how ill men, when passion takes the lead of judgment, may consider a question upon which they undertake to decide; and to convince you how far they have upon this occasion overrun the scent in the eagerness of their pursuit.

I will trouble you with the statement of a circumstance, although it must, I should think, suggest itself to every person who considers this

case. On the one hand, Lord Melville's enemies charge him with conniving, from selfish motives, at Mr. Trotter's misconduct. On the other, he is charged with having applied very large sums, properly applicable to naval purposes only, to other services of the state. Now can it, under the shadow of reason, be asserted, if Lord Melville was so intent, as he is charged with having been, upon Mr. Trotter's emoluments, that he would have violated the law, and assumed the responsibility consequent upon it—for what? For the purpose of taking from this same Mr. Trotter a very great proportion of the funds which he might otherwise have converted to his profit. If it be possible, it is at least highly improbable that he should have been actuated by a corrupt motive in each of these transactions. And, is it going too far to say, if he be charged with corruption in both, that his accusers should at least be held to proof of his guilt:—that they should, in the mean time, be driven in equity to their election, or the public give credit to neither?

The speeches which have been published as those of certain members of the House of Commons contain much which, I dare say, never was uttered, and certainly much which might be combated with success. I was not present at the debates, and cannot take upon myself to say whether the report of them, which has been circulated,

originates from an understanding or a misunderstanding of those speeches. I know, however, from what was spoken by the enemies of Lord Melville in the House (if he can be said to have had enemies where all were his judges), his persecutors out of it have taken occasion to lay upon him the most gross and the most groundless calumnies that ever were accumulated on the head of a deserving man; and, not content with general accusation, they descend to particular instances of his intolerant and intolerable disposition.

They charge him with being tyrannical—vindictive—implacable. By all the accounts I have ever heard of him, from his enemies as well as from his friends (excepting indeed his present calumniators), I cannot but believe that there never was a man of more conciliating temper, or more largely gifted with good-nature. He has held many and very superior offices in the state, and yet in the whole course of his public life he cannot be justly charged with having excited an expectation which he did not do his utmost to realize. I never heard (with a single exception, which I disbelieve) of his having applied the authority of office to crush or to injure a political opponent. No pains have been spared which could be applied to his disparagement. When the repertory of truth was exhausted, re-

course has been had to the teeming fecundity of invention. And where, after all, is the man, against whom, in the wide scope of forty years public life, something might not have been said with some degree of truth, though not so much as his enemies have dared to pronounce against him, with every degree of falsehood?

His interference in the case of Mr. Henry Erskine is denied. No man stands higher, and no man, I believe, deserves to stand higher, than that gentleman in public estimation. But genius, and learning, and wisdom, cannot be so closely interwoven as to exclude the fallibility of our nature from entering into the conduct of our lives. And I fear that, at a time when principles, which all men now unite in denominating pernicious, prevailed, he inadvertently, and unintentionally, did that which was by the propagators of those doctrines themselves mistaken for lending them his countenance. It is upon every account deeply to be lamented; but, at the time Mr. Erskine's supersession took place, it was absolutely necessary to our safety, that no man should be in a leading station whose principles and conduct were not eminently and incontrovertibly loyal. I do not, therefore, conceive what ground of accusation could here be found against Lord Melville, even if he had done that which I believe he never did.

With respect to the late Duke of Bedford, much has been said, and much might, I doubt not, be added in his praise. But we are not to swallow down an accusation against Lord Melville, for no better reason than its having been made palatable by the Duke of Bedford's character. His Grace did, I am informed, take a part, which, if he had lived (and for the sake of the public I wish he had), he would probably have repented. If I did not believe his understanding would have led him to a change of political opinions, I could not deem so highly of it as I do. Let that, however, be as it may, we are not now to take it for granted that Lord Melville cast away a portion of our national strength rather than gratify his Grace with the command of a corps. Had his offer (if he ever made one) been as patriotic, as the enemies of Lord Melville must make it seem selfish, he would have relinquished his claim to the command, rather than suffer the nation to lose such an accession to its strength. But is it fair to infer the operation of public or of private resentment from a Minister's declining, at such a time, to confer the command of volunteers on a person who was so decidedly hostile not only to the measures of Government, but apparently to the Government itself?

Yet pray, my dear Sir, is not all this unconnected with the question? and is it possible that these topics can have been agitated with any view

but that of inflaming the public mind, and thereby promoting the objects of private rancour? It is at best a contrivance to prevent the eyes of the people from fixing on the point in issue; and, like the stratagem of a juggler, who attracts your attention from his design, that he may shuffle a cheat upon your understanding.

Let me now call your attention to another consideration. Is it not melancholy to see the petty shifts to which great talents are sometimes prostituted on political occasions? It is said of Lord Melville, there never was a more undiscriminating oppressor of his opponents; there never was such a tyrant in politics; such a relentless persecutor of his adversaries. Do you, his accusers, dare to charge him with partiality in his choice of public servants? Do you venture to accuse him of ever having been swayed by political considerations in his selection of men for commands? Do you presume to assert that he has not, upon all occasions, without any reference to party, chosen those who were most likely to forward the service of the state? Oh, no! But then Lord North acted upon similar principles *on a particular occasion!* What wretched paltering! Is it, indeed, to be believed, that my Lord Melville's disinterested conduct has been rendered necessary by the long and uninterrupted practice of his predecessors? Can a First Lord of the Admiralty (like the first magistrate of the nation),

from the nature of his office, do no wrong? Is there no instance recorded of a man in this high station, when compelled to employ an adversary, having nominated a friend to counteract him? or have we nothing in the conduct of the late First Lord which might be contrasted to Lord Melville's advantage? But, alas! his is a singular destiny; we must look into the page of proscription for his sentence: upon a false accusation he is to be condemned; upon an admission of his virtues he deserves no praise.

When his defence of Sir John Jervis and Sir Charles Grey, in the House of Commons, is spoken of, it is insinuated, that, by the introduction of the subject, his Lordship expected to deprecate the vengeance of his judges. I will not dwell on such pitiful surmises. Every body knows that he, by his influence and manly eloquence, reduced the opponents of those gentlemen to a very inconsiderable minority. And what has been his recompense? An admission of the fact must necessarily involve in it an admission of a favour conferred; the fact is therefore denied; and after his Lordship had cut off opposition, we are decently told he had nothing to contend with. Is it any longer to be doubted that all the vices are imbodied in ingratitude? You will hardly, I presume, expect me to confer the dignity of argument upon this masterpiece of thanklessness; this cutting and cruel per-

version; this vile and detestable denial of right. Such a rank and flagitious fallacy; such a foul attempt to defraud merit of its due, is an outrage on the nature of reason, and almost a libel on the character of falsehood: it is disgusting in all its progress and in all its aspects; in its origin, in its being, and in its end. It is *corruption*. Engendered like "life in excrement," it rises from the rottenness of morals.

But although some of Lord Melville's enemies reason (if I may so call it) as I have stated, there are others who take an opposite direction. These do not deny, but tacitly admit the effect which his powers had on the case, and content themselves with declaring their freedom from obligation. Thus equally noxious, like rival poisons, they meet, and mix, and neutralize each other. In a denial of his influence the obligation is admitted, and his influence is admitted when the obligation is denied.

His enemies have not done with him yet. Here, say they, here is a dilemma for you, and make your election. Either Lord Melville knew that Sir John Jervis and Sir Charles Grey were in the right, in which case he deserves no praise for having supported them; or he knew they were in the wrong, in which case he abandoned his duty in not bringing them to punishment. Do these doughty

logicians forget that there are cases *to* which punishment may reach without blame, or mercy be extended without censure? This was one of them. Any vote of punishment would, I believe, have been ratified and applauded by the populace, and it therefore held out a fair opportunity for the indulgence of political animosity. But Lord Melville chose to spare, when he might have punished, and he placed in full view every circumstance of extenuation which could tend to mitigate rigour. And can any man have the effrontery to say that his retribution has been the offspring of generosity or justice? It is no common degree of magnanimity which enables a man to become the advocate of his adversary, and no common degree of baseness which can repay it with persecution. If I considered any person indebted to me for his safety, I confess to you I could not but loathe his friends by whom I had been offered such a clout of a dilemma to wipe off the score. I thank my God the cold-blooded philosophy, under whose domination alone such a return could be tolerated, no longer exists; and that I write to you after having passed the day when ingratitude was ranked with the virtues!

I do not intend to enter into the views of the inveterate and merciless enemies of Lord Melville. Their sense of duty, unconnected with every other consideration, is said to have impelled them to their conduct. For their own sakes, I wish it had

been traced to another source. Then, indeed, not knowing how far persecution is admissible in politics, my ignorance would have left me open to a belief that the accusers of his Lordship are merely so in their political capacity, and that, as men, they are not without the instincts of humanity.

Where the law annexes a specific punishment to a given offence, we must submit in silence; but where there is discretion in the judicature, perhaps it is not too much to say, that there ought not to be infamy in the punishment, if there has not been turpitude in the crime; and I, for one, will never lend my breath to blast the character of a man whose conduct I cannot believe to have been in any respect even interested, and must believe to have been in many instances meritorious.

I have gone more at length into this subject than I intended. I was led to it from an anxiety to justify my sentiments to you, and a greater anxiety still to vindicate the rights of justice.

I am, &c. &c.

THE END.

S. Gosnell, Printer, Little Queen Street.